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This paper investigates on the demographic, economic, political and cultural determinants of direct 
democracy in European States using an index of citizen law-making for 43 countries. The test is 
interesting since there are important variations across European countries in the referendum and initiative 
use. We find that per capita income, population and ethnic fractionalization are poor determinants of 
direct democracy, while majoritarian elections and presidential systems are in general negatively related 
to direct democracy. A larger share of Catholic population is a positive determinant, whereas Muslims 
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1.  Introduction 
The debate on direct democracy has been in the political science and public choice literature 
for long time. In recent years scholars have triggered several theoretical and empirical studies that 
essentially discuss: 1) the competence of the voters; 2) the role the special interest groups that can 
fund election campaigns may have to subvert public policy process; 3) the how direct democracy 
affects policy; 4) the how direct democracy influences economic performance.  
This paper departs from these strands of literature by presenting and empirically evaluating a 
number of economic, demographic, political and cultural determinants of direct democracy. 
Specifically, we investigate on the impact of these elements on a unique dataset of country index on 
citizen law making in European countries. The definition of Europe used here is larger than the one 
we are used to: it amounts to 43 countries, which include most of the countries that emerged from 
the break-up of the USSR. 
We do not dwell on legal and institutional details; however, it is useful to define a few terms 
and provide a little institutional context before proceeding. Direct democracy is a broad term that 
encompasses a variety of decision processes, including town meetings, recall elections, initiatives, 
and various forms of referendums. This paper focuses on the two most important and widely used 
processes, the initiative and referendum. The right of initiative is the right of citizens to put an issue 
onto the political agenda of a polity. The referendum is a ballot vote on a law already approved by 
the legislature, also qualified for the ballot by collecting a predetermined number of signatures. In 
both cases citizens are involved, by registering or signing an initiative and by taking part in the final 
decision-making in a referendum.
1   
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature. In section 3 we 
present the methodology to construct the Country Index on Citizen Law-Making which is the 
indicator we use to measure direct democracy. Section 4 describes the data and specifies the 
                                                 
1 There is some inconsistency in terminology from both substantive and formal point of view. Referendum is sometimes 
used as a broad term for all ballot propositions and sometimes for the particular process of challenging a government 
law by petition. Furthermore, we use referendums instead of referenda according to the recent literature.    2
variables used for the empirical analysis. We then present the main results in Section 5. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
Theoretical and empirical literature on the impact of economic, political and demographic 
conditions on the extent of democracy is not well developed. A few number of theoretical models 
has been developed on the effect of cultural conditions on democracy (Huntington, 1991; Putnam, 
1993; Landes, 1998). These studies typically use the religious affiliation as a proxy for the 
“dimension” of the culture (i.e. ethic, tolerance, trust), yet they do not investigate on democracy as 
an univocal concept, they rather refer to democracy as a government performance. Putnam (1993) 
analyzes the effect of public good provision, while Landes is concerned with the flow of people, 
goods and ideas between countries. Furthermore, many cultural explanations of democratic 
institutions and policies have a political element to them, as Landes’s emphasis on the use of 
intolerance for political ends makes clear. 
The empirical literature on direct democracy has focused on two issues: the relationship 
between initiatives and referendums on government spending, and the impact of direct democracy 
institutions on economic performance. In both cases the object of the analysis are Switzerland and 
the US states.  
In the first strand of literature Matsusaka (1995) points out that there are three reasons why 
state initiatives improve resource allocation. First, the possibility of vote trading between legislators 
for sub-optimal projects is reduced by the threat of direct legislation. Second, the removal of agenda 
control by the legislature allows projects closer to the preferences of the median voter to appear on 
the ballot. Third, problems of imperfect information which may lead either to well-intentioned 
representatives implementing undesirable policies or to legislative shirking are reduced when the 
public votes directly on legislation. Matsusaka analyzes the impact of initiatives over a 30-year 
period and concludes that initiatives are used to reduce tax burdens as well as to reduce overall state   3
and local government spending. The results indicate that voters are moving away from fiscal 
policies that are redistributive and moving towards policies that are more closely tied to economic 
activity. Feld and Matsusaka (2003) find that that government spending is lower in Swiss cantons 
with mandatory referendums. The effect of these referendums on spending is larger as the spending 
thresholds fall and as initiatives become more costly for voters to use. The magnitudes are 
remarkably large, implying 19 percent lower spending for a mandatory referendum with the median 
spending threshold and initiative signature requirement.
2 
Moving to the second strand of literature, Feld and Savioz (1997) compare the economic 
performance of Swiss cantons that have direct democracy to cantons without direct democracy. 
They find that cantons with initiatives have 5.4% higher output in the period 1984-1993 and almost 
17% higher output in 1990. It should be noted that no theoretical reason is given for this result. 
Blomberg et al. (2004) constructed a growth model in which initiatives can play an important role 
in determining the resource allocation of public capital and found that initiatives can lead state 
economies closer to their optimal allocations. Testing the implications of this model using U.S. 
state-level data from 1969 to 1986, they find that states with initiatives waste about 20-30% fewer 
resources and converge to their steady states about a third faster than do non-initiative states.  
Our paper relates to the empirical literature that has analysed the relationship running from 
growth to democracy. The benchmark in this field is Barro (1999). Barro analyzes a panel of 100 
countries from 1960 to 1995 and tests the relationship between economic development and the 
country’s propensity to experience democracy which is measured using both a subjective indicator 
of electoral rights compiled by Gastil (various years) and his followers from 1972 to 1995 and a 
related variable by Bollen (1990) from 1960 to 1965. The author also considers other possible 
determinants of democracy, many of which have been proposed in the political science. The results 
of the model show that higher standard of living promotes democracy. Specifically, democracy 
increases with per capita GDP, primary schooling and more equal educational opportunity across 
                                                 
2 Feld and Kirchgassner (2001) find that debt referendums reduce borrowing and spending in Swiss municipalities, and 
Bohn and Inman (1996) get that they restrict borrowing in U.S. states.   4
the sexes (smaller gap between male and female primary attainment). A significant and negative 
relation relates democracy to the Muslim variable, even when the measures of standard of living 
and the other explanatory variables are held constant. Furthermore, for a given standard of living, 
democracy tends to fall with the urbanization, while rises with the middle-class share of income.  
Recently, Matsusaka (2005) in reviewing the existing theory on the changes that direct 
democracy may have on public policy, affirms that demographic and technological trends are 
stimulating an unprecedented growth in popular decision-making across the world. The rising 
education among the population and the falling of the information costs due to the communication 
technology revolution have dramatically reduced the knowledge advantage that elected officials had 
over ordinary citizens. The result of these trends is that important policy decisions are shifting from 
legislatures to the people by eclipsing legislatures in setting policy agenda. Matsusaka bases such 
assertion by simply reporting data on the growing amount of higher education in the American 
population; yet he do not provide any statistical test for this claim, as he focus on the review of the 
literature about the initiative and the referendum to highlight some key issues for the future.  
 
3. An index of direct democracy 
As a measure of direct democracy we use the Country Index on Citizen Law-Making 
(CICLM) calculated by the Initiative and Referendum Institute Europe (Kaufmann, 2004). This 
index is a unique measure of the quality of direct democracy and its performance by applying the 
procedures the country’s political system provides in order to proposing, approving, amending and 
deleting laws through popular initiative and referendums. Specifically, CICLM is based on the 
procedural elements that contribute to measure the quality of direct democracy and its performance. 
Such elements are distinguished in fundamental, essential, important and useful. The fundamental 
elements take into account the exclusions on issues from initiative and referendums; entry hurdles 
(such as the number of signatures that need to be collected); time limits to collect signatures;   5
majority requirements or quorums for the validity of the vote, and the way in which signatures are 
collected.  
The essential elements include the role of the parliament either to discuss referendum issues 
and recommend a decision to the citizens or to have the right to put a counter-proposal on the ballot; 
the presence or the absence of an independent authority in charge of the supervision process. The 
important elements apply essentially the periods of time the government, the parliament and the 
electorate have at their disposal to deal with an initiative or a referendum proposal. Finally, the 
useful elements encompass a possible support for the work of the initiative group by the 
administration and a democratic and openly communicative infrastructure in the community (such 
as free and central places of assembly; political infrastructure open to all; free advertising space in 
newspapers, on radio and television or public spaces).  
On the background of these elements and of the historical record,
3 a country-rating into seven 
categories is provided for 43 European countries.
4 Each country is classified as: 1) radical 
democrat; 2) progressive; 3) cautious; 4) hesitant; 5) fearful; 6) beginner and, finally, 7) 
authoritarian. For the ease of exposition, in Table 1 we have assigned a number in the 1 to 7 scale 
for each category, with 7 being the country rated as radical democrat, and 1 countries with the 
lowest level of direct democracy. The only country ranked 7 is Switzerland, then there are 7 
countries ranked 6. The largest group (15) is made of countries ranked 5, while 8 are classed 4, 4 
are ranked 3, 7 are classed 2, and 5 are ranked 1. In the estimation we have converted this ranking 
so that they lie between 0 and 1 scale, as it is common in this literature.    
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
3 The index is a subjective measure of direct democracy that takes into account both the actual referendums and 
initiatives and the quality of the process. Consider the case of Belarus. In this country 9 referendums have been held 
from 1995 to 2004, but the country has the lowest possible score. Referendums were proposed and used by President 
Lukashenko to increase its power at the expenses of the legislature, and a positive vote has been allegedly obtained by 
the means of arrests of political adversaries and pressures on the population. 
4 Kaufman (2004) provides also the evaluation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, because many economic, social and 
institutional data were not available for these countries in the dataset we have used, we decided to exclude it from our 
sample, because in a cross-section the software just drops the countries that have missing data.    6
  We need to point out a few limitations of this index. First, it does not tell anything about 
which kind of topics are called for referendums and initiatives. For example, we cannot distinguish 
whether a country is more inclined to have referendums on economic or civil issues, for example. 
Second, the index mixes together the legal possibility of having referendums and initiatives and the 
actual choice of exercising them. Since these two circumstances belong to different characteristics 
of each country (the constitution and the law, on the one hand, and parties or movements in the 
political arena, on the other hand), and we cannot discriminate between them.    
 
4.  Model and data 
We estimate two models. In the first we assume that all independent variables are exogenous 
with respect to the index of direct democracy. We basically consider variables as population, ethnic 
fractionalization and so on. In this case OLS estimates are used. In the second model we include 
variables that may be endogenous to direct democracy. For example, higher corruption may 
negatively affect the likelihood of a country to use initiatives and referendums because the civil 
society is not endowed with instruments such free press that make it possible an open discussion on 
political and economic issues. At the same time, in a country with a low CICLM index politicians 
will tend to keep issues apart from the people and under-invest in social capital to avoid being more 
closely scrutinised by voters reducing the room for corruption. In these cases we use instrumental 
variables and two stages least squares (2SLS) to address the issue of endogeneity. In both case we 
correct estimates for heteroscedasticity, to take care of fact that the democracy index takes discrete 
values. 
The first model is the following: 
 
i i i i i CICLM ε α α α α + + + + = REL INST ECDEM 3 2 1 0    (1) 
   7
where  CICLM is the variable defined in the previous Section
5,  ECDEM is a vector of 
economic and demographic variables, INST is a vector of institutional variables, REL is a vector of 
religious variables, and ε is an error term. ECDEM includes LYP, the log of GDP per capita in the 
year 2000, LPOP, the log of population, and HET, which measures ethnic fractionalisation. INST 
consists of two dummy variables: MAJ and PRES for majoritarian and presidential systems, 
respectively. REL includes CATHO and MUSL, which are the percentages of population that are 
Catholic and Muslim.  
The second model has the following specification: 
  
i i i i VAR CICLM ε β β β + + + = 2 1 0 Z         ( 2 )  
 
where Z is a vector of variables that were significant in the first model, and VAR is the 
variable of interest that we add once at time. These variables include CORR  (perception of 
corruption)  PRIGHTS (political rights), PROPDEF (the extent to which property rights are 
protected), and GOVEFF (measuring the competence of the bureaucracy and the quality of public 
service delivery). 
To address endogeneity we use legal the origin of each country: British (common law), 
French, German, Scandinavian (all part of the civil law tradition), and Socialist, as instruments. In a 
number of papers Shleifer with his co-authors has argued that legal origins have an impact on 
institutions and therefore on outcomes (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002 provide a theoretical 
interpretation of these differences). For example, legal origins affect judicial independence and this 
has an effect on the protection of property rights (La Porta et al., 2004); legal origins affect the 
regulation of entry and this influence corruption (Djankov et al., 2002); the quality of government 
and political rights impinge on the legal origins (La Porta et al., 1999). Fig. 1 suggests that legal 
origins are not correlated with direct democracy, and therefore they can be effectively used as 
                                                 
5 Gross and Kaufmann (2002) provided a first version of this index for 32 European countries. However, definitions and 
methodologies are different and they cannot be merged to obtain a meaningful panel.    8
instruments. For the ease of reading, CICLM is multiplied by 10. Our argument is then examined 
with the overidentifying restriction test. 
  The variable CICLM is taken from Kaufmann (2004), fractionalization is taken from Alesina 
et al. (2003), institutional variables are taken from Persson and Tabellini (2003), CORR is from 
Lambsdorff (2005),
6 GOVEFF are from Kaufmann et al. (2005), the remaining variables are from 
La Porta et al. (1999). Table 2 gives summary statistics for all the variables involved in our analysis. 
A correlation matrix is given in the appendix at the end of the paper.  
  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
5.  Empirical results 
Table 3 present the results for the first model. Looking at the overall picture, we find that LYP 
is positive in the first two estimates, meaning that richer countries have the resources to organise 
referendums and other forms of direct democracy. However, the size of the coefficient and its 
significance falls down as long as more regressors are added.
7 In contrast, LPOP is usually not 
significantly different from zero. We think that this is the result of two opposite driving forces. On 
the one hand, smaller countries can find direct democracy more feasible (Switzerland being the 
typical case). On the other hand, for bigger populations, we can also add economies of scale in 
running referendums. A similar argument applies to HET: Kaufmann (2004) maintains that in a 
more heterogeneous country direct democracy can build consensus on sensitive issues by uniting 
different groups. However, we can also think that a larger ethnic group can exploit a minority via 
referendums (developments in Iraq exemplify the two issues: via referendum on the constitution 
                                                 
6 In the original index 1 is given to countries with the highest perception of corruption, 10 to those with the lowest 
perception. We have reversed the order to have results easier to interpret.     
7 Barro (1999: S160) stated what we can call “the common wisdom” on the relationship between growth and democracy 
“increases in various measures of the standard of living forecast a gradual rise in democracy. In contrast, democracies 
that arise without prior economic development ...tend not to last.” Acemoglu et al. (2005) show that controlling for 
factors that simultaneously affect both variables by means of country fixed effects removes the statistical association 
between income per capita and democracy. Moreover, they show that the long-run evolution of income and democracy 
is related to historical factors. Acemoglu et al. (2005) look for causality between income and democracy using 
instrumental variables such as past savings rates and changes in the incomes of trading partners. The nature of our 
dataset prevents us the use of these strategies.   9
they are trying to build a credible state power to all ethnic groups, and at the same time the Sunni 
minority has been trying to reject it because it will spoil their previous position, given the alliance 
between Shia and Kurds). Empirically, none of these forces prevails. As seen in the previous 
discussion, small population and low fractionalization tend to go together. The insignificance of 
these two variables may be led by possible correlation between them since small countries are 
probably homogeneous constituency with limited diversity, and this would not call for direct 
democracy to solve divisive issues. In column (3) we re-estimate the model by excluding LPOP, but 
HET is still insignificant. The same happens by excluding HET and keeping LPOP.
8 
Adding the institutional variables MAJ and PRES does change the overall picture. We would 
expect a negative effect, since the theoretical literature on presidentialism and majoritarian elections 
maintains that the policy outcomes under these two systems are closer to voters’ preferences. For 
example, they tend to lower government spending, which according to Matsusaka (1995) is closer 
to their preferences. Therefore, there is a reduced need to make use of direct democracy. Moreover, 
Persson et al. (2000) maintain that these systems make representatives and executives more 
accountable to voters; therefore they cannot drift away from voters’ preferences. Both MAJ and 
PRES are negative, but they become significant at the lowest level when LPOP is removed and 
religious variables are added.
9 Religious variables (CATHO and MUSL) have opposite effect. A 
higher fraction of population with a Catholic faith significantly increases the level of direct 
democracy. In contrast, the Islamic faith significantly reduces the quality of direct democracy. It 
should be noted that in both cases the size of the coefficients is small. These results partially 
contradict the finding by can be negative following the argument developed by Landes (1998) and 
La Porta et al. (1999) that these religions tend to undermine civic virtues. The share of Protestants is 
however significantly positive only in the most parsimonious specifications of the model. These 
results are available upon request.  
                                                 
8 Details are available upon request from the authors. 
9 Federalism may be another institutional arrangement that keeps policy choices closer to voters’ preferences. Using a 
dummy variable for federal systems, we found that this variable is negative but insignificant. Details are available upon 
request   10
We have also considered two dummy variables: FMRSOC, for countries that were socialists 
before 1989, and FMRUSSR, for countries that were previously part of the USSR. This because 21 
countries of our sample were previously socialist, and 10 belonged to the USSR. In some of former 
USSR countries Islam is the leading religion, therefore we wished to perform a robustness test. In 
column (5) the variable MUSL is affected neither in its size nor in its significance by the inclusion 
of FMRUSSR. Instead, presidentialism looses its significance. In column (6) FMRSOC is also non 
significant, indicating that there is no relationship between being a former socialist country and the 
current level of direct democracy.  
 The estimated equations explain a sizable share of the variability of CICLM, with an 
adjusted R
2 ranging from 46% to 63%. At the same time the F-statistics always reject the null at the 
1% level.  
  In estimating the second model, we first have to choose the variables to add in the vector Z. 
We decided for the variables that in the first model appear more consistently significant, therefore 
we have included MAJ, CATHO, and MUSL. As discussed above, in these 2SLS estimates we have 
added legal origin dummy variables to address endogeneity. Among the British, French, 
Scandinavian, German and Socialist legal origin we have chosen the first as the reference and used 
the remaining four in the regressions. The results show that indicator of good governance such as 
political rights, defence of property rights and government effectiveness are significant determinant 
of direct democracy, whereas higher corruption leads to lower direct democracy. The estimated 
equations show a high F test for joint significance of the variables, and the over-identification χ
2 is 
always within the boundaries of insignificance, maintaining that we cannot reject the null of 
exogeneity between the instruments and the dependent variable. 
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have addressed the issue of the determinants of direct democracy. In doing 
so, we have exploited a newly available dataset that encompasses 43 countries belonging to an   11
enlarged Europe. We have estimated two models: the first includes only exogenous variables; the 
second also includes variables that may have a reverse causality effect with direct democracy. The 
first model shows that income per capita is not related to direct democracy when more variables are 
included in the estimations. Demographic variables such as population and ethnic fractionalization 
do not have significant effect. Institutional variables as presidentialism and majoritarian voting rules 
have a negative effect, since they probably make representatives more accountable to voters, 
making less compelling to appeal to referendums and initiatives. However, their significance is not 
high, and depends on the specifications. More consistent results are obtained by religious variables: 
an higher percentage of Catholics increases direct democracy, whereas the opposite is true for 
Muslims.  
When we move to possibly endogenous variables, we find that a more corrupted country is 
less likely to have referendums and initiatives, with a possible issue of accountability involved in 
this result. Political rights, defence of property rights, and government effectiveness are 
significantly positive determinants of direct democracy,  
  The index we applied suffers from some limitations that future research needs to overcome. 
First, we used a cross-section of countries. On the one hand, this causes a reduction in the number 
of observations and degree of freedom. On the other hand, it does not allow us to follow the pattern 
of the countries across time. Second, the number of countries is limited to European ones. Third, the 
index does not allow us to distinguish between issues that have been asked for referendums and 
initiatives. Even considering these caveats, we believe that our analysis provides useful insights on 
the determinants of direct democracy, and fills a gap in a literature that has been mainly concerned 
with two countries, and on the consequences of direct democracy. The construction of an index that 
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Table 1 – The Country Index of Citizen Law-making  
Country Score    Country  Score
Albania 2    Latvia  5
Armenia 1    Liechtenstein  5
Austria 5    Lithuania  6
Azerbaijan   1    Luxembourg  5
Belarus 1    Macedonia  2
Belgium 5    Malta  4
Britain 4    Moldova  2
Bulgaria 5    Netherlands  6
Croatia 3    Norway  5
Cyprus 3    Poland  5
Czech Republic  5    Portugal  5
Denmark 6    Romania  4
Estonia 4    Russia  1
Finland 4    Serbia-Montenegro  2
France 5    Slovenia  6
Georgia 2    Slovakia    6
Germany 4    Spain    5
Greece 3    Sweden    4
Hungary 4    Switzerland    7
Iceland 3    Turkey  2
Ireland 6    Ukraine  1
Italy 6     
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Table 2 – Summary statistics 
Variable Mean  Variance Min  Max
CATHO 36.600    38.796 0.000  97.300
CICLM 0.548    0.275 0.000  1.000
CORR 4.553  2.622 0.300    10.000
FMRSOC  0.488 0.506 0.000 1.000
FMRUSSR  0.232 0.427 0.000 1.000
GOVEFF  0.788   0.954 -0.930   2.250
HET 0.277  0.180 0.041    0.587
LPOP  3.825   2.847 -1.329   9.272
LYP  9.391   0.792 7.641   10.839
MAJ 0.445    0.476 0.000  1.000
MUSL  7.603   20.736 0.000   99.200
PRIGHTS 6.024  1.439 2.000    7.000
PRES 0.349    0.477 0.000  1.000
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Table 3 – OLS results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant  -1.598***    
(0.443) 
-1.345***   
(0.438) 
-0.358    
(0.575) 
-0.289     
(0.535) 
-0.014     
(0.462) 
-0.734     
(0.641) 
LYP  0.227***    
(0.044) 
0.203***   
(0.042) 
0.094    
(0.059) 
0.090   
(0.056) 




LPOP  -0.004    
(0.012) 
0.005    
(0.011) 
    
HET  0.093     
(0.149)   
0.136     
(0.178) 
0.115    
(0.148) 
   
PRES    -0.106    
(0.084) 
-0.134*    
(0.067) 
-0.120*   
(0.066) 
-0.062    
(0.070) 
-0.123*    
(0.071) 
MAJ    -0.081    
(0.065) 
-0.086*    
(0.049) 
-0.084*    
(0.049) 
-0.091**    
(0.049) 
-0.092*   
(0.048) 








MUSL    -0.0022***   
0.0008 
-0.0022***   
(0.0008) 









      0.078         
(0.076) 
Obs.  43 43 43 43 43 43 
Adj-R
2  0.451 0.494 0.615 0.610 0.632 0.616 
F  10.68***  7.22***  9.564*** 11.56*** 10.29*** 9.621*** 
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Table 4 – 2SLS results 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
POLRIGHTS 0.087** 
(0.039) 
    










    0.090**     
(0.042) 
Obs.  43 40 43  43 
F
  59.50*** 42.07*** 56.18***  65.52*** 
Over-id  1.385 1.186 2.407  2.043 
Covariates include: MAJ, CATHO and MUSL. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. *, **, and *** 

























 DATA APPENDIX 
 
Correlation matrix 
 CATHO CICLM CORR FMRSOC FMRUSSR GOVEFF  HET LPOP  LYP  MAJ MUSL  PRIGHTS  PRES  PROPDEF 
CATHO  1.000    0.585    -0.241    -0.240    -0.379  0.326    -0.059    -0.042    0.491    -0.046  -0.293    0.455    -0.214    0.201 
CICLM    1.000    -0.605    -0.393    -0.601  0.697    -0.099  -0.345    0.657    -0.301  -0.402    0.757    -0.492    0.520 
CORR      1.000    0.792    0.553  -0.963    0.351    0.527    -0.867    0.370  0.332    -0.733    0.553    -0.827 
FMRSOC       1.000    0.606  -0.762    0.425    0.496    -0.771    0.303  0.044    -0.558    0.515    -0.725 
FMRUSSR          1.000  -0.626    0.430    0.437    -0.633    0.197  0.126    -0.585    0.708    -0.471 
GOVEFF            1.000  -0.330    -0.533    0.892    -0.336  -0.355    0.807    -0.545    0.830 
HET              1.000    0.333    -0.326    0.061  0.024    -0.334    0.346    -0.225 
LPOP                1.000    -0.537    0.459  0.268    -0.530    0.448    -0.510 
LYP                  1.000    -0.247  -0.379    0.773  -0.596    0.791 
MAJ                    1.000  0.057    -0.264    0.323    -0.305 
MUSL                      1.000    -0.591    0.114    -0.261 
PRIGHTS                        1.000   -0.509    0.684 
PRES                         1.000      -0.512 
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